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While the importance of enterprise support policies in the EU continues to grow, there remains 
only limited empirical evidence examining the effects of the policies on socially relevant 
outcomes such as employment. This paper shows how to exploit firm-level data, formed by merg-
ing longitudinal employment and firm demographic information with the firm-level archives of the 
incentive payments, to offer robust counterfactual impact evaluation evidence on the employ-
ment effects of the coexisting European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) co-sponsored, 
national and regional programs commonly operated in many EU regions. The analysis uses data 
from a large northern Italian region and yields employment impacts of the policies under plau-
sible identification assumptions, disentangling the impacts of different values of both the 
economic intensities of the program assistance and different forms of assistance (the latter distin-
guishing between capital grants and below-market interest rate/revolving loans). The paper finds 
that the absolute per-firm employment effects of the programs are increasingly larger the higher 
the economic value of the incentives awarded to the assisted firms. The incentives with the high-
est per-firm economic value, however, yield employment impacts with a much higher cost per 
each additional new job than incentives with a lower economic value. The results of the analysis 
also show that the absolute per-firm employment effects of soft loans are similar to those of capi-
tal grants. However, taking into consideration that soft loans bear a much lower cost in terms of 
public money devoted to the subsidies than capital grants, the impact estimates retrieved from 
analysis indicates that soft loans possess an higher employment effectiveness than capital grants.
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1. Introduction 
 
While the European Union spends billions of euros on enterprise support policies aimed at 
fostering regional economic development and social cohesion (13.6 billions of euros for the 
2007-2013 programming period, Barca 2009), the empirical evidence on the effectiveness of 
such policies based on rigorous counterfactual impact evaluation studies is still very limited.  
As also argued elsewhere (e.g. Bartik 2004 and Bartik and Bingham 1997), empirical 
counterfactual impact evaluations attempting to estimate how much of the different outcomes 
between treatment and control groups are attributable to the program/s are a crucial tool for 
evaluating enterprise support policies. Sound counterfactual impact evaluations on the 
proximate employment or local economic growth outcomes of the policies provide vital 
empirical evidence that are also a necessary base for possible subsequent survey and focus 
group analyses and/or regional econometric models aimed at estimating (when the importance 
of the program is appropriate) more distant fiscal and employment benefits in terms of long-
run or province/regional/state- economy effects. 
Retrieving sound counterfactual impact estimates for enterprise support policies is not 
an easy task, as the analysis has to disentangle the program effects from the many 
confounding factors that do affect firms and economic growth outcomes independently from 
the programs being evaluated and because of the simultaneous presence of a significant 
number of many competing enterprise support programs (ERDF -European Regional 
Development Fund- co-sponsored, national and regional programs) often available in a same 
area.  
To date, the available rigorous counterfactual impact evaluations of enterprise support 
policies in EU countries were able to analyze only single-policy implementations (e.g. 
Bondonio and Greenbaum 2006; Bronzini and Di Blasio 2006, Adorno et al. 2007), The 
impact of capital subsidies: new estimations under continuos treatment, Giornale degli 
Economisti ed Annali di Economia, 66(1), 67-92.).  This is primarily due to the lack of 
comprehensive data on the whole array of ERDF co-sponsored incentive payments and the 
entire set of national and regional enterprise support programs available in a particular 
geographic area. There are two main limitations to analyss lacking comprehensive program 
activity data. First, it is not possible to undertake comparative evaluations to assess which 
types of policy designs are more effective (in terms of the different forms of assistance and 
characteristics of the firms targeted by the program incentives). Second, no information is 
available on the whether the comparison-group firms not assisted by the ERDF program 
examined in the analysis received some assistance from other national or regional public 
programs. As a result, in order to correctly identify counterfactual impact estimates, single-
program evaluations have to rely on the crucial hypothesis that the probability of firms 
gaining access to additional unobserved regional or national programs incentives is the same 
across both the assisted firms and the comparison group firms that did not receive assistance 
from the single observed program being evaluated.1 
                                                 
1 In Bondonio and Greenbaum (2006) data were geographically aggregated at the province level, with units of 
observation operationalized as province-sector cross tabulations. At such aggregate level, treated units of 
observation (i.e. Obj.2 areas) and non-treated units of observations (i.e. non objective 2 areas) were eligible for 
the same assistance provided by the platform of national and regional incentives available without any specific 
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With the availability of comprehensive firm-level databases encompassing the entire 
set of ERDF co-sponsored national and regional programs, counterfactual impact evaluation 
studies can exploit the programs’ heterogeneity to provide empirical evidence of great interest 
to policy makers. Further, such evaluations can be made more useful for policy purposes by 
measuring program impacts based on variation in the monetary values of the incentives, 
variation in the forms of assistance (e.g. capital grants versus repayable soft-loans), and 
variation in the types of firms targeted for assistance.2  
This paper offers an empirical model that yields robust and useful counterfactual 
impact estimates from the availability of such comprehensive firm-level databases, underlying 
the importance that these types of databases are maintained by regional and national public 
authorities throughout the EU.  The empirical model developed in the analysis exploits the 
heterogeneity of a large number of co-existing national, regional and ERDF co-sponsored 
programs to yield impact estimates of the policies that disentangle the impacts of different 
values of both the economic intensities of the program assistance and different forms of 
assistance, distinguishing between capital grants  and below-market interest rate/revolving  
loans. 
The impact estimates produced in the paper capture the employment effects of a group 
of 8 national programs, 6 former national programs devolved to the regional government, 4 
regional programs and 7 Obj.2 area programs co-funded by the ERDF operating in a large 
northwestern Italian region (Piemonte) in the 2001-2003 period. The employment outcomes 
considered in the analysis are aimed at capturing the proximate effects of the support policies, 
disentangling the part of the firm-level outcome variation that was indeed due to the programs 
effects from the part due to socio-economic factors independent from the programs 
interventions. The focus on estimating proximate effects of the support policies is due to the 
fact that the economic importance of the group of assisted firms, compared to the size of the 
entire regional/national economies in which they are located is still limited (as it is very often 
the case with every enterprise support policy).  As a result, even if, in principle, enterprise 
support programs of all sorts are somehow capable of affecting distant outcomes, such as 
macro-economic or long-run indicators of the well-being of residents measured at the level of 
the entire regions in which eligible firms are located, any actual program impact (in the form 
of a positive shock given to the regional economy) becomes virtually undetectable from the 
changes to the outcome variable of the evaluation caused by many confounding factors of a 
much greater importance than the possible programs-induced improvements in the economic 
activity of the assisted firms. 
The program impact estimates produced in the analysis focus on medium-terms effects 
(with a time span of a maximum of 3 years after the program support). This is because using 
rigorous comparison-group statistical impact evaluation designs to assess whether or not 
business incentives had long-lasting impacts on employment or other economic activity 
                                                                                                                                                        
geographical targeting. At such aggregate level, therefore, the hypothesis that treated and non-treated units were 
assisted in comparable ways by the programs not included in the analysis is more plausible. 
2 In the United States, in the case of the Enterprise Zone programs, such comparative evaluation studies provided 
valuable empirical evidence  on the different specific policy features (among the heterogeneous State-specific 
policy designs) that were more effective in boosting employment and other proximate business activity 
indicators (e.g. Bondonio and Greenbaum 2007, Peters and Fisher 2002, Greenbaum and Engberg 2004, Engberg 
and Greenbaum 1999). 
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outcomes of the assisted firms is often to be avoided when the evaluation is carried with firm-
level data. Assisted firms are economic units embedded in many ways in a network of 
economic transactions from one to the others. In the long-run a possible positive program 
shock produced on the employment of each single assisted firm is likely to have enough time 
to generate subsequent impacts also on non-assisted firms.  Those outcome data become 
endogenous to the treatment and cannot anymore be considered unaffected by the program 
incentives and used to retrieve counterfactual estimates.3 
 The empirical evidence produced by the analysis indicates that the absolute per-firm 
employment effects of the programs are increasingly larger the higher the economic value of 
the incentives awarded to the assisted firms. The incentives with the highest per-firm 
economic value, however, yield employment impacts with a much higher cost per each 
additional new job than incentives with a lower economic value.  The results of the analysis 
also show that the absolute per-firm employment effects of soft loans are similar to those of 
capital grants. However, taking into consideration that soft loans bear a much lower cost in 
terms of public money devoted to the subsidies than capital grants, the impact estimates 
retrieved from analysis indicates that soft loans possess a much higher employment 
effectiveness than capital grants.   
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the features of 
the enterprise support policies considered in the analysis and illustrates the methodology 
behind the “net equivalent subsidy” figures used to compute the monetary values of the 
incentives. Section 3 describes the data used in the analysis, the programs activities and the 
employment descriptive statistics.  Section 4 describes the econometric model used to retrieve 
the counterfactual impact evaluation estimates.  Section 5 illustrates and discusses the results 
of the analysis.  Section 6 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. Enterprise Support Policies and Computation of the Gross Grant Equivalent 
 
The enterprise support policies considered in the analysis are summarized in Tables 1-4. 
These policies represent the entire set of public assistance available to industrial firms in the 
Northern-Italian region of Piemonte from National and Regional (including former national 
incentives devolved to the regional government) and ERDF-co-sponsored subsidies4 during 
the 2001-2003 period. 
                                                 
3 Estimating the impact of enterprise support policies in terms of long-run macro-economic or employment 
benefits for an overall province/regional/state economy, could be attempted using regional macroeconomic 
simulation (e.g. REMI – Fan et al. 2000;  HERMIN – Bradley and Herce 1995 Bradley et  al. 2003, QUEST –
Roeger 1996, Ratto et al. 2008). This is a viable evaluation option when the importance of the economic outputs 
of the assisted firms is not disproportionably smaller than the size of the local economy and the background 
elasticity parameters of the simulation model can be adequately tested and supported by convincing evidence. 
Even in such cases, analyses with regional macroeconomic simulation models, however, should be performed 
only after having previously estimated (with a rigorous counterfactual approach based on micro-data) the 
program impact on proximate firm-level outcomes. This is because the set of multipliers used by regional 
macroeconomic models should not be applied directly to the measures of program activity (such as the entire 
volume of jobs or investments generated by the assisted firms), but instead only to the number of additional jobs 
or new investments that the assisted firms would have not generated being absent the program incentives. 
4 Excluded from the analysis are solely a small number of programs for which data on the incentive payments 
were not transmitted by the public authorities in charge of  managing the subsidies. 
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[Tables 1-4] 
 
2.1 Computation of the Gross Grant Equivalent 
 
In order to comparatively estimate the impacts of the different support programs, all data on 
the economic value of the incentives granted to the assisted firms are transformed into gross 
grant equivalent (GGE) values. The GGE values used in the analysis are computed as the net 
present values of the gross grant equivalent subsidy paid to the assisted firms (considered in 
terms of absolute value of the equivalent grant rather than as the ratio between the equivalent 
grant and the value of the assisted investment). 
 In practical terms, data on the payments concerning capital grants subsidies 
(applicable to either capital- or interest-rate- expenditures), in most cases, were close to be 
readily interpretable as GGE. Data on soft loans (below-market-rate-loans) financing, instead, 
in order to be computed as GGE, needed to be transformed into the net present value of the 
difference between the flow of interest payments made by the assisted firms at the below-
market-rate provisioned by the program and the flow of interest payments that the assisted 
firms would have made at market rates.5 
 
 
3. Data on Programs Activities, Share of Assisted Firms, and Employment Descriptive 
Statistics 
 
The data used in the analysis is the result of integrating business data from the Italian National 
Statistical Institute (ISTAT) with governmental programmatic data. 
Business data covering the years 2000-2003 come from ISTAT-ASIA (i.e. the 
statistical archive of active firms maintained by the ISTAT6), which provides an extract of the 
statistical archives of active firms.  The data contain employment and demographic 
information for all of the active firms located in the Piemonte region and operating in the 
following industrial sectors:  mineral extractions (code C of the ISTAT Ateco-20027 
classification); manufacturing activities (code D, ISTAT Ateco-2002); production and 
distribution of electricity, natural gas, steam and hot water (code E, ISTAT Ateco-2002).  We 
also draw data from the ISTAT 2001 Italian Census of Industry and Services (for the part 
concerning the establishment-level data on local units located in the Piemonte region). 
 Policy data come from various Italian public authorities, including the Ministry of 
Production Activities, Mediocredito Centrale, Regione Piemonte, Finpiemonte, and Sviluppo 
Italia.  The data on program activity for each of the enterprise support policies contain 
information on the dates and amounts of each subsidy payment.  Further, each of the program 
activity databases has the data organized by a unique identifier for the recipient firms, the 
                                                 
5 Formally, the GGE values computed for the data on soft loans benefits are retrieved following the 
specifications indicated in the Annex I of the Guidelines on National Regional Aid, Official Journal of the 
European Communities 98/C 74/19, 1998. 
6 ISTAT-ASIA is formed by admninistrative data on firms demograpohic, employment and  sales information  
provided  by a number of Italian national agencies. 
7 Ateco-2002 is the latest standard industrial classification produced by ISTAT.  
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V.A.T identification number. Such unique identifier allows the programmatic data to be 
merged with ISTAT business data.  The final database includes the following firm-level 
information:  geographic location of the firm legal residence; standard industrial sector (5 
digits Atceo-2002); legal form of enterprise; yearly average stock of total employment (years 
2000-2003); yearly monetary values (in terms of gross grant equivalent) of the subsidies 
received, sorted by name and type of the programs; number of firm’s local units; whether or 
not the firm is a craft enterprise. 
 
 
3.1. The Distribution of the Incentives by Type of Enterprise Support Programs and 
Characteristics of the Assisted Firms 
 
Table 5 illustrates the number of assisted projects funded by each of the twenty-five enterprise 
support programs considered in the analysis and the corresponding total gross equivalent 
grant (GGE) value of the incentives paid to the subsidized firms. The individual program 
registering the highest total GGE value of incentives awarded to firms in the Piemonte Region 
in the 2001-2003 period is Law 488/92, with 65.4 million €, equal to 16.5% of the total8. The 
program of Law 266/97, article 14, providing  support to enterprises in distressed urban areas, 
follows with about 49.1 million € of GGE value of subsidies (equal to 12.4% of the total). The 
subsidies of Law 140/97 (R&D aid with automatic eligibility rules) are in third place with 
48.8 million € of GGE (12.3% of the total).9 
 
[Table 5] 
 
The distribution of the incentives by firm-size (measured by total number of workers), can be 
described as follows: firms with 10 to 49 workers receive a 46% share of the GGE value of all 
incentives; firms with 50 to 249 workers receive a 28% share of the GGE value of the 
incentives; 15% of the GGE value of the incentives are granted to the micro-firms with up to 
9 workers; the remaining 11% of the GGE value of the incentives are granted to the large 
firms with 250 or more workers. 
Also of interest is the distribution of the assisted firms by the number of different 
program interventions by which they were subsidized in the 2001-2003 period. Among all 
assisted firms, 38.3% were subsidized by two or more program interventions (22% by two 
interventions; 9.8% by three interventions; 6.5% by four or more interventions, with a 
maximum of eight different program interventions for two of the assisted firms). The 
remaining 61.7% of assisted firms were subsidized by a single program intervention. 
 Sorted by firm size, the percentage of treated firms that were granted assistance by a 
single program varies from 79% for micro-firms up to 9 employees to 40% for firms between 
                                                 
8 With the exclusion of the portion of the program administered by the Italian Ministry of Education, University 
and Scientific Research which focused on supporting R&D projects and research centers. 
9 Not surprisingly, in Table 5 the programs with the highest volume of GGE subsidies are those providing capital 
grant assistance. This is because, as indicated in section 2.1, the GGE value for the repayable soft loans is 
computed based solely on the net present value of the differential between the hypothetical flow of the market-
rate interest rate payments on the assisted loan and the actual flow of the interest rate payments at the discounted 
rate. 
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50 and 249 employees (with 60% of the firms between 50 and 249 employees that received 
assistance under two or more different programs in the 2001-2003 period, Table 6). The 
percentage of subsidized firms assisted by multiple programs is also very high within the 10-
49 employees category, with 43.5% of such firms receiving assistance from two or more 
different programs.10 
 
[Table 6] 
 
3.2. Percentages of Assisted Firms on the Total Number of Active Firms 
 
Table 7 shows the percentages of assisted firms on to the total number of active firms located 
in the Piemonte region.  From 2001 to 2003, 11.1% of all active firms with industrial 
production activities (ISTAT Ateco2002 codes: C, D and E) were assisted under at least one 
business incentive program.  Micro-firms with up to 9 employees, however, are composed by 
a large number of solo-entrepreneur firms (with no employees) engaging in professional 
services unsuitable for public assistance. Ignoring such micro-firms brings the number of 
assisted firms to much higher percentages.  Among firms with 50-249 employees, 63.5% of 
all active firms were subsidized by at least one program during the 2001-2003 period, while 
such percentage is 42.7% and 37.5% for firms with 250 or more employees and firms with 
10-49 employees, respectively. 
 
[Table 7] 
 
3.3  2000-2003 Employment Changes per Type of Assisted Firms 
 
Tables 8-14 contain the descriptive statistics for the 2000-2003 employment changes sorted 
by the categories of assisted firms based on the economic intensity and type of the public 
assistance that they received and on their initial firm-size.11 
Table 8 highlights the 2000-200312 average per-firm absolute variation in the number 
of employees separately for assisted and non-assisted firms.  To limit the effects of possible 
measurement errors in employment change figures,  47 outlier firms were excluded from the 
analysis (of which 35 non-assisted firms and 12 assisted firms).  Such excluded firms 
experienced either a positive or negative workforce variation beyond 0.5 per thousand 
percentile limit of the 2000-2003 employment change distribution.  
 
[Table 8] 
                                                 
10 The number of different program interventions are computed by counting as a single intervention all of the 
subsidies granted by a same program in a same year.  
11 It should be clear that such descriptive statistics do not represent in any way the actual impact estimates of the 
employment effects of the program. The employment changes highlighted in this section, indeed, could have be 
caused by many economic changes and factors totally independent by the programs interventions. To infer on the 
actual employment impacts due to the program incentives, such descriptive statistics have to be compared with a 
credible estimates of the counterfactual changes. Results from the next sections of this paper will highlight such 
counterfactual empirical evidence.  
12 For new firms, such variation is the difference between 2003 and the year in which the firms started operating. 
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The group of non-assisted firms in the 2000-2003 period experienced an average employment 
loss of 0.76 employees per firm. In the same period, the assisted firms experienced a positive 
average employment change of 0.48 employees per firm. The average employment change 
recorded by the assisted firms is further detailed in Table 9, which reports the average 
changes per categories of assisted firms based on the GGE value of the incentives received. 
Figures reported in Table 9 shows how the most positive average employment change was 
recorded in the firms that received incentives of the highest GGE value:  Positive 15.9 
employees per firm in the category of firms receiving incentives beyond the 99.5th percentile 
(with more than 909,742€ GGE worth of incentives);  positive 4.7 employees per firm in the 
category of firms with GGE incentives between the 95th and the 99.5th percentile (GGE 
between 269.302€ and 909.742€); positive 1.7 employees per firm in the category of firms 
with GGE incentives between the 90th and the 95th percentile (GGE between 168.795€ and 
269.302€); and positive 2.55 employees per firm for firms within the 9th decile (GGE between 
89.351€ and 168.795€). 
 
[Table 9] 
 
Table 10 contains descriptive statistics for the 2000-2003 employment change experienced by 
categories of firms defined by both the GGE value and the type of the incentives that they 
received. The 236 firms assisted exclusively with soft loans, on average, experienced an 
employment increase of 1.61 employees per firm, while the increase recorded in firms 
assisted solely with capital grant was 0.13 employees per firm. The 1,049 firms assisted by 
both below-market-rate loans and capital grants, finally, experienced an increase of 1.57 
employees per firm.  
 
[Table 10] 
 
Table 11 reports the 2000-2003 per-firm average employment change sorted by firm size 
categories.  In each firm-size category, non-assisted firms consistently recorded negative 
employment changes: -0.12 employees for firms between 1 and 9 employees; -3.51 
employees for firms from 10 to 49 employees; -23.36 employees for firms from 50 to 249 
employees; -19.19 employees for firms with 250 or more employees.  Their counterpart 
assisted firms recorded instead positive employment changes in the categories up to 49 
employees and a negative change in the categories from 50 employees up (of a magnitude 
largely inferior to that of the non-assisted firms in the category between 50 and 249 
employees; and of a magnitude slightly larger than that of non-assisted firms in the 250 and 
more employees category). 
 Within each firm-size category, the assisted firms that recorded the best employment 
outcomes were consistently the ones receiving incentives of the highest GGE value (i.e. firms  
within the IV quartile of the GGE distribution of assisted firms). 
 
[Table 11] 
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Next, we turn to the methodological approach used to tease out the impacts of the program 
interventions by attempting to establish the counterfactual. 
 
 
4. Methods  
 
Ideally, counterfactual impact evaluations of enterprise support policies require comparing the 
pre-post intervention outcome variation experienced in the group of treated units with an 
adequate estimate of the outcome variation that would have been experienced in the same 
treated units in the absence of the program intervention. 
 To assess how much of the actual changes in the outcome variable of the analysis are 
attributable to economic trends and other factors completely independent from the programs 
interventions it is crucial to use data not only on firms that received assistance but to also on 
the non-assisted firms.   
In general, comparing the outcomes of assisted and non-assisted firms follows an 
impact identification strategy referred to as “comparison group design.”  In “comparison 
group” designs, data on non-assisted firms are used as a base to estimate the magnitude of the 
outcome changes that would have affected the assisted firms also in the absence of the 
programs incentives.  Using the non-assisted firms is a means to estimate the impact exerted 
on the outcome variable of the analysis by factors such as general or sectoral economic trends 
or socio-demographic, behavioral and institutional changes that are part of the overall 
economy in which both the assisted and non-assisted firms operate. 
With comparison group design evaluations, if it were possible to analyze groups of 
assisted and non-assisted firms identical to each other, program impact estimates would be 
retrievable by simply comparing the average pre-post intervention changes in the outcome 
variable of interest between the assisted and non-assisted firms.  Lacking a random 
assignment into the treatment, one of the fundamental challenges that the empirical analysis 
has to face is the fact that assisted and non-assisted firms may be different in many ways.  
When this is true, the different initial firm characteristics may interact differently with the 
general economic trends and/or socio-demographic, behavioral and institutional changes 
commonly experienced in the region where the assisted and non-assisted firms operate.  Such 
different interactions could result in changes in the outcome variables that would occur 
differently between the assisted and non-assisted firms even in the absence of the program 
intervention, causing the program impact estimates to be biased (i.e. selection bias; see Bartik 
2004, Bartik and Bingham 1997 and Bondonio 2000 for a general discussion of “comparison 
group designs” analyses). 
 To address such selection bias issues within the general “comparison group design” 
approach, the empirical analysis implemented in the paper is a three steps “conditional 
difference in difference” (CDD) model (e.g. Heckman et al. 1998, Ho, Imai, King and Stuart. 
2007).  
In the first step, a single indicator is created to summarize all relevant firm 
characteristics (measured at the pre-intervention time, year 2000) that may interact with the 
general economic trends and/or socio-demographic, behavioral and institutional changes to 
generate a change in the employment dynamic for the subsequent years 2001-2003 
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(independently from the programs interventions).  Such indicator, referred to as “propensity 
score” (PS), is estimated from a probit regression model estimated for each category of 
programs intervention considered in the analysis and yielding the predicted probability of 
receiving that particular type of program assistance for each firm (e.g. Bondonio 2009; 
Heckman, et al. 1997, 1998; Rosembaum and Rubin 1983; Bondonio and Engberg 2000).  
 The second step establishes common support between assisted and non-assisted firms.  
For each category of treatment, the assisted firms with PS higher than the 99.5 percentile of 
the PS distribution of the firms not assisted under the same category of treatment are 
eliminated from the analysis.  This procedure is aimed at eliminating, within each category of 
treatment, the assisted firms with initial characteristics too unique and non-comparable to 
those of the firms non-assisted under the same treatment category (Ho, Imai, King and Stuart. 
2007, Bondonio and Engberg 2000) . 
  In the third step, the programs impacts for each category of treatment are estimated 
though a regression design characterized as a CDD model implemented on the sample of 
comparable firms selected from step two.  In such CDD regression design, the outcome 
variable is differentiated between the post and pre-intervention time (2003-2000), ensuring 
that all of the unobserved differences that may exists between assisted and non-assisted firms 
(within each category of treatment) are controlled for if they are characterized as fixed effects 
(i.e. initial firms characteristics that affect future outcome variable levels in a constant manner 
over time).  Through the inclusion of set of explicit covariates (expressing a number of 
observable firms characteristics such as industrial sector, size, location, and firm age) the 
model is also capable of controlling for the differential impact on the outcome variable 
between the assisted and non-assisted firms due to some remaining different initial observable 
characteristics, even if such characteristics are not characterizable as fixed effects and they 
may affect future outcome variable levels in a non constant manner over time.  
  The estimation of such a three steps empirical model is finally completed by an 
extensive sensitivity analysis aimed at testing the volatility of the program impact estimates to 
different functional forms with which the observable control variables may be included in the 
actual specifications of the CDD regression design described in step three. 
  The  2000-2003 firm-level employment changes used as the outcome variable of the 
model is expressed in terms of absolute changes rather than as percentage changes. This is 
because the economic rationale of the enterprise support programs considered in the analysis 
is based on producing socio-benefit outcomes at the level of the local economies surrounding 
the place in which the assisted firms operate.  As a result, the social benefit of each additional 
job generated by the programs incentives (compared to what would have happened in the 
absence of the program) is to be weighted equally whether or not such additional job is 
generated in a small or large firm.  While from the point of view of the assisted entrepreneurs, 
the significance of a given employment change has to be weighted based on the initial size of 
the assisted firm, this is not necessarily the case from the point of view of employment 
changes for a local community, and operationalizing employment changes as percentage 
changes would place an unjustified larger weight to the outcomes produced in the smaller 
assisted firms. 
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4.1. Model specifications 
 
The model specifications are operationalized differently according to the types of categorical 
treatment variables included in the CDD regression design.  
 
-Impact Estimates by the Economic Intensities of the Incentives 
In order to estimate the differential impacts of the program incentives at different levels of the 
economic value of the incentives, two model specifications were adopted.  The first 
specification contains four binary treatment variables based on the quartile thresholds of the 
distribution of the GGE values of the incentives received by the assisted firms.  The second 
specification contains twelve binary treatment variables based on the decile thresholds of the 
distribution of the GGE values of the incentives,  with the last decile (which contains assisted 
firms with outlier GGE value of the incentives) further divided into three categories: 90- 95 
percentile thresholds; 95-99.5 percentile thresholds; and above the 99.5 percentile threshold.  
Impact estimates obtained from the first specification highlight the absolute (per-firm) 
employment variation attributable to the programs incentive, separately estimating the 
differential impacts of four different categories of the economic values of the incentives.  
Similarly, the second specification yields the programs employment effects separately 
estimating the differential impacts of twelve different categories of the economic values of the 
incentives. 
  In detail, the two model specifications are estimated through the following three steps: 
 
I) Estimation of a set of n probit models (n=5 for the first specification; n=13 for the second 
specification) in which the dependent variables are the categorical treatment variables (4 
and 12, respectively, in addition to 1 non-treated category n=0): 
 
P[Tn=1] = f(DIM, PROV,SETT, CRAFT,SINGLE_EST, NEW, VANISH); (1) 
 
Where: 
n=[1st quartile, 2nd quartile, 3rd quartile, 4th quartile, 0] (for the first specification); 
n=[1st decile;……; 9th decile, 90-95 perc; 95-99.5 perc; ≥99.5 perc; 0]  (for the 
second specification); 
T(n=1 qrt) =1 if a firm received a GGE economic value of the incentives below 
the threshold of the first quartile of the distribution; 
=0 if a firm either did not receive any incentive or received incentives 
of different GGE value; 
[…] 
T(n=1 dec) =1 if a firm received a GGE economic value of the incentives below 
the threshold of the first decile of the distribution; 
=0 if a firm either did not received any incentive or received 
incentives of different GGE value; 
[…] 
T(0) =1 if a firm did not receive any incentives during the 2001-2003 
period; 
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=0 if a firm did receive any type of incentives; 
DIM=  set of four binary variables coding whether or not a firm belongs to one 
of the following size categories:  micro-firm (0-9 employees); small 
firm (10-49 employees); medium firm (50-249 employees); large firm 
(250 or more employees); 
PROV = set of eight binary variables coding the province location of the firm’s 
headquarters; 
SETT  =set of sixteen binary variables coding the industrial sector of the firms 
(following the two-digit ISTAT Ateco2002 classification); 
CRAFT = 1 for craft firms (for which public assistance may also be available 
through additional dedicated programs);  
  = 0 for non-craft firms; 
SINGL_EST= 1 for single establishment firms; 
  = 0 for multiple establishment firms; 
NEW  = 1 for firms that began operating after 2000;  
= 0 for firms already in existence during year 2000; 
VANISH = 1 for firms that cease operations during the 2000-2003 period;  
= 0 for firms continuing to operate during the 2000-2003 period. 
 
II)  The propensity scores obtained from each of the probit specifications estimated in step I) 
are separately ordered for the firms having Tn=1 and Tn=0 for each of the n treatment 
categories considered in the two model specifications. Separately for each of the n 
treatment category, the firms with Tn=1 (the treated firms for the nth treatment category) 
having a PS higher than the 99.5 percentile of the PS distribution for the Tn=0 firms are 
eliminated from the analysis.  
 
III)  Programs impact estimates are retrieved through the following CDD regression design 
estimated from the sample of firms resulting from step II:  
 
Yi= + ∑nTni+ ∑dDIM_di+ ∑pPROV_pi + ∑sSETT_si + CRAFTi+ 
SINGLE_ESTi+ NEWi + VANISHi +   (2) 
 
Where 
Yi = 2000-2003 absolute employment change; 
∑nTni = set of treatment status variables specified as follows: n1st quarter; 2nd 
quarter; 3rd quarter; 4th quarter for the first specification13; n1st decile; 2nd 
decile; ……;8th decile; 9th decile, 90- 95 percentile; 95-99.5 percentile; >99.5 
percentile for the second specification14; 
                                                 
13 1st quartile (<9,661€ GGE); 2nd quartile (9,661€-25,685€ GGE); 3rd quartile (25,686€-69,857€ GGE); 4th 
quartile (>69,857€ GGE). 
14 1st decile (<4,085€ GGE); 2nd decile (4,086€-7,586€ GGE); 3rd decile (7,587€-11,860€ GGE); 4th decile 
(11,861-17,532€ GGE); 5th decile (17,533€-25,685€ GGE); 6th  decile (25,686€-37,187€ GGE); 7th decile 
(37,188-56,108€ GGE); 8th  decile (56,109€-89,350€ GGE); 9th decile (89,351€-168,795€ GGE); 90-95 
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Equation (2) expresses the 2000-2003 employment change as a function of the program 
incentives and a series of pre-intervention firm specific characteristics representing a source 
of potential outcome variation due to factors that are independent from the programs 
incentives.  
By differencing the outcome variable, the model controls for firm-specific unobserved 
fixed effects that may affect employment differently between firms of different treatment 
categories and non-treated firms.  Through the inclusion of the set of binary control variables 
(DIM, PROV, SETT, CRAFT, SINGLE_EST, NEW, VANISH) the model of equation (2) also 
controls for employment-change differences due to heterogeneity between treated and non-
treated firms (and between firms of different treatment categories), when such heterogeneity 
is not characterized in terms of fixed effects. 
 
-Impact estimates by the types of programs incentives  
The differential impacts of the program interventions due to the different types of incentives 
awarded to the assisted firms are estimated through two additional specifications of the 
baseline CDD model previously described. 
The first specification includes three categorical treatment variables in the model of 
equations (1) and (2) in order to separately estimate the employment impact of the incentives 
under the form of capital grants,15 soft loans and a combination of both.  The second 
specification, at the expense of some statistical efficiency, includes ten different categorical 
variables in the model of equations (1) and (2).  Such ten treatment variables are aimed at 
estimating the different employment impact of the different types of incentives, 
simultaneously controlling for the economic value of the incentives (as expressed by the 
GGE).  This is achieved by generating each categorical treatment variable from cross 
tabulating four different degrees of the economic value of the incentives with the distinction 
between capital grants, soft loans and capital grants plus soft loans.16 
 
 
5. Results 
 
Table 12 highlights the programs impact estimates for four different categories of treated 
firms based on the overall economic value (in terms of gross grant equivalent -GGE) of the 
incentives. The results show that the average employment impact of the programs is 1.87 
additional jobs compared to what would have happened without the programs incentives in 
each assisted firm when the per-firm GGE value of the incentives is within the first quartile of 
distribution (less than 9,661€); 1.69 additional jobs per assisted firm when the GGE value of 
the incentives is between 9,662€ and 25,685 (second quartile of the distribution); 3.20 
                                                                                                                                                        
percentile (168,796€ -269,302€ GGE); 95-99.5 percentile (269,303€ - 909,742€); >99.5 percentile (>909,742€ 
GGE). 
15 The capital grants category also includes fiscal bonuses, non-refundable contributions to pay for interest rate 
expenses without the offering of any additional collateral guarantee to the underlying loan. 
16 Such cross tabulation is yielding ten treatment variables instead of twelve because none of the firms assisted 
by soft loans received subsidies with a combined GGE value above the threshold of the II° quartile (25,685€, 
Table 10). 
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additional jobs per assisted firm when the GGE value of the incentives is between 25,686€ 
and 69,857€ (third quartile of the distribution);  6.87 additional  jobs per assisted firm when 
the GGE value of the incentives is greater than 69,857€ (fourth quartile of the distribution). 
 
[Table 12] 
 
Based on the impact estimated reported in Table 12, the overall employment impact produced 
by the incentives awarded to the entire set of the 5,284 assisted firms can be summarized as 
follows: 
 The 6.5 million € spent for the incentives with a per-firm GGE value less than  9,661€ 
(first quartile threshold) accounted for a total increase of  approximately 2,470  jobs 
compared to what would have happened in the absence of the incentives. The average 
cost for each job attributable to the incentives is equal to about 2,640€; 
 The 21.75 million € spent for the incentives with a per-firm GGE value between 
9,661€ and 25,685€ (second quartile) accounted for a total increase of approximately 
2,235 jobs (compared to what would have happened in the absence of the incentives), 
with an average cost of each job attributable to the incentives equal to about 9,730€; 
 The 57.3 million € spent for the incentives with a per-firm GGE value between 
25,685€ and 69,857€  (third quartile) accounted for a total increase of approximately 
4,330 jobs compared to what would have happened in the absence of the incentives, 
with an average cost for each job attributable to the incentives equal to about 13,550€; 
 The 288.9 million € spent for the incentives with a per firm GGE value above 69,857€  
accounted for a total increase of approximately 9,058 jobs compared to what would 
have happened in the absence of the incentives, with an average cost for each job 
attributable to the incentives equal to about 31,891€. 
 
For the sake of brevity, detailed results from the second model specifications (including 12 
different treatment categories based on different per firm GGE values) are not shown and are 
available from the authors. Findings from such model, however, are very much in agreement 
with the results summarized in table 12: 
 The per-firm employment impacts of the incentives are confirmed to be the highest in 
the treatment categories with the greatest GGE value (except for a slight decrease of 
the employment impact going from the two lowest deciles to the deciles immediately 
above them; and with a sharp increase of the employment impact for the incentives in 
the highest percentile –GGE above 909,742 €); 
 When weighting the employment impacts by the GGE value of the incentives, the 
average cost for each additional job is again greater the higher is the economic value 
(GGE) of the subsidy received by the assisted firms.17 
                                                 
17 To correctly interpret these results, it is important, once again, to keep in mind that the economic value of the 
incentives (expressed in terms of GGE) does not coincide with the total value of the subsidized investment made 
by the assisted firms. As a result, the average cost per each additional job attributable to the incentives should not 
be interpreted as the volume of the additional investments required to generate an additional job. Moreover, the 
economic value (in terms of GGE) of all of the incentives awarded as soft loans is generally quite low. Receiving 
incentives with an economic value in the lowest percentiles is therefore strongly correlated with the receiving of 
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5.1 Impact Estimates by Types of Incentives 
 
Table 13 summarizes the impact estimated sorted by the different types of incentives awarded 
to the subsidized firms.  The coefficient estimates reported in Table 13 separately highlight 
the number of additional jobs (against a counterfactual estimate) generated on average by 
each treated firm belonging to three different categories: firms assisted solely by soft loans; 
firms assisted solely by capital grants; firms assisted by both soft loans and capital grants. 
When a treated firm receives capital grant assistance, the per-firm average employment gain 
compared to what would have happened in the absence of the incentives is estimated to be on 
average 2.83 additional jobs, all else equal.  If a treated firm receives only soft loans, the per-
firm average employment gain compared to what would have happened in the absence of the 
incentives is estimated to be 2.44 additional jobs.  For treated firms granted with both capital 
grants and soft loans assistance, the estimated per-firm average employment gain compared to 
what would have happened in the absence of the incentives is estimated to average 4.16 
additional jobs.18 
 
[Table 13] 
 
The results from the second model specification, which allows separate identification of the 
employment impacts for capital grants, soft loans and mixed types of assistance, controlling 
for four different intensities of the economic value of the incentives, can be summarized as 
follows:19 
 When the incentives have a GGE value up to 9,661€, the threshold of the first quartile 
of the distribution, soft loans generate a per-firm employment average gain of 2.53 
jobs compared to what would have happened in the absence of the incentives. This 
estimate corresponds to an average cost of each job attributable to the incentives equal 
to 852 €. Capital grants generate a per-firm employment gain of 1.52 jobs, with an 
average cost of each job attributable to the incentives equal to 3,580 €. Multiple aid 
under the form of both soft loans and capital grants generate a per-firm employment 
gains of 2.55 jobs, with an average cost of each job attributable to the incentives equal 
to 2,351 €. 
 When the incentives have a GGE value between 9,661€ and 25,685€, second quartile 
of the distribution, capital grants generate a per-firm employment gain of 1.84 jobs, 
                                                                                                                                                        
soft loans instead of capital grants. Because of such correlation, the impact heterogeneity across the different 
categories of economic values of the incentives should be considered as affected not only by the different 
monetary values of the incentives but also by the different types of assistance (soft loans versus capital grants). 
Such employment impact heterogeneity across different types of assistance is specifically highlighted in the 
results summarized in Table 13. 
18 Such estimates are under the form of categorical average treatment impact, ignoring the possible heterogeneity 
among the different economic values of the incentives received by the firms assisted with capital grants, soft 
loans or both these forms of assistance.  Results that also incorporate heterogeneity in the economic values of the 
incentives are presented later in this section. 
19 For the sake of brevity, tables with the complete results from this model specification are not included in the 
paper and are available upon request to the corresponding author: daniele.bondonio@sp.unipmn.it. 
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with an average cost of each additional job equal to 8,899€. Multiple aid under the 
form of both soft loans and capital grants generate a per-firm employment gain of 1.14 
jobs, with an average cost of each additional job equal to 14.823€.20 
 When the incentives have a GGE value between 25,685€ e 69,857 €, the third quartile 
of the distribution, capital grants assistance generates an average per-firm employment 
gain of 2.94 jobs, with an average cost of each additional job equal to 14,498 €. 
Multiple aid under the form of both soft loans and capital grants generate an average 
per-firm employment gain of 3.57 jobs, with an average cost of each additional job 
equal to 12,868€. 
 When the incentives have a GGE value above 69,857 €, the fourth quartile of the 
distribution, capital grants generate a per-firm employment gain of 7.32 jobs, with an 
average cost of each additional job equal to 29,733€. Multiple aid under the form of 
both soft loans and capital grants generate a per-firm employment gain of 7.18 jobs, 
with an average cost of each additional job equal to 30,755€.21 
 
Overall, the results highlight that the average employment impact of the programs without 
controlling for the differences in their economic value is of the same magnitude across the 
various types of incentives.  Soft loans, however, do show a greater effectiveness than capital 
grants due to the fact that they achieve the same degree of efficacy as capital grants by 
offering to the assisted firms a “gift” in terms of public money devoted to the incentives of 
lesser monetary value than capital grants, resulting in lower average cost for each additional 
job attributable to the incentive programs.  
 
 
5.2 Results of the Sensitivity Analysis 
 
The robustness of the employment estimates is tested through an extensive sensitivity analysis 
composed of a series of additional model specifications.  
 The alternative specifications are obtained through different choices in selecting the 
functional forms by which the independent variables are inserted in the third step of the 
empirical model (equation 2).  For the sake of brevity, it is not possible to describe the 
detailed results of all the different specifications included in the sensitivity analysis, but the 
complete results are available upon request.  Overall, the empirical evidence yielded by the 
entire set of the different specifications included in the sensitivity analysis is in close 
agreement with the results presented.  
 
                                                 
20 For such incentives with GGE values within the second, third and fourth quartile of the distribution, it is not 
possible to identify the employment impact of the soft loans. This is because in all the program activity data used 
in the analysis the GGE values of such incentives are always below the threshold of the first quartile (9,661€), 
with the only exception of three cases with a GGE value within the second quartile threshold 25,686€). 
21 As already mentioned before, it is important to emphasize that the differential impact estimates obtained for 
the different types of incentives are obtained controlling for the economic value of the subsidies operationalized 
as the cost to the public of the incentives (GGE) and not under the form of the total financing awarded to the 
assisted firms. In the case of soft loans incentives, it is worth reiterating that the GGE value is largely inferior to 
the total financing received to the assisted firms for their subsidized investments. 
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5.3 Caveats and Limitations  
 
 The sample of firms assisted with soft loan incentives is quite small (236) and largely 
inferior to the sample of assisted firms that received capital grants (3,999) and to the 
sample of firms that received capital grants in conjunction with soft loans assistance 
(1,049). Such small sample size does limit, to a certain extent, the external validity of 
the results related to the differential impacts between different forms of assistance. 
Moreover, by computing the economic value (in terms of –GGE) of the soft loans 
assistance, it was not possible to take into account the share of the cost related to the 
possible defaulting of some of the subsidized firms. 
 
 Pre-intervention employment changes recorded in both treated and non-treated firms 
would constitute a very useful observable control to include in the empirical 
conditional difference in difference (CDD) model used to yield the programs impact 
estimates. As commonly encountered in counterfactual impact evaluations of 
enterprise support policies, however, the pre-intervention employment trends recorded 
in both treated and non-treated firms cannot be included in the analysis as part of the 
set of observable control variables. This is due to the fact that the employment changes 
recorded in years prior to 2001 likely were affected by the previous rounds of the 
unobservable incentive payments related to number of incentive programs that were in 
existence before 2001.  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper exploits a unique firm level database formed by merging reliable administrative 
data on firms’ demographic and employment activity from the Italian National Statistical 
Institute, ISTAT, with the programs’ activity archives on a complete set of co-existing 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) co-sponsored programs and other 
independent national and regional incentives available to all active firms with industrial 
production in a large north-western region of Italy.  
Analyzing the entire spectrum of such co-existing programs (8 of which are national, 
10 regional and 7 with ERDF co-sponsoring) enables, at first, to estimate how the entire set of 
public assistance available within a same NUT III region of the EU is divided between 
assisted firms of different characteristics and to estimate the percentage of all active firms 
receiving public assistance. This type of preliminary information is very important to policy 
makers and yet is very rarely available throughout the EU due to the lack of integration 
between the different single-program activity archives and reliable administrative data on the 
entire population of active firms. In this regard the main findings produced by the Italian data 
analyzed in this paper can be summarized as follows: 
 
- The largest share (46%) of the economic value of the entire set of the programs 
incentives available is awarded to small enterprises (with 10 to 49 workers), while 28% 
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goes to middle enterprises (from 50 to 249 workers), 15% goes to micro- firms (less 
than 10 workers) and 11% goes to the largest enterprises (250 or more workers). 
 
- Assisted firms rely quite often on multiple sources of incentives.  For example,  about 
60% of all medium enterprises receiving public assistance in the 2001-2003 period  
were awarded with incentives from two or more programs.  Among all size classes of 
assisted firms, approximately 38% received assistance from multiple programs. 
 
- The overall percentage of active firms receiving public assistance is truly remarkable. 
During the 2001-2003 period alone, 63.5% of all active medium enterprises were 
subsidized with incentives from at least one public program, and 42.7% of large firms 
and 37.5% of small enterprises (excluding the micro-firms with fewer than ten workers) 
received subsidies.  
 
Next, by developing a statistical counterfactual impact evaluation model, this paper exploits 
the extensive Italian firm level database to yield employment estimates on the comparative 
effectiveness of the different forms of incentives.  Such employment impact estimates are 
retrieved by disentangling the impacts of different values of both the economic intensities of 
the program assistance and different forms of assistance, distinguishing between capital grants 
and below-market interest rate/revolving  loans.  
Results from the impact evaluation analysis highlight that the absolute per-firm 
employment effects of the programs are increasingly higher the higher their economic value 
(in terms of gross grant equivalent subsidy) of the incentives awarded to each assisted firms. 
When the per-firm employment increases are compared to the costs of the subsidies, the 
incentives with the highest per-firm economic value, however, yield employment impacts 
with a much higher cost per each additional new job generated compared to the estimated 
counterfactual status of incentives with a lower economic value. 
Disentangling the program impacts of the different types of incentives, the results  
show that the absolute per-firm employment effects of soft loans assistance are similar to 
those of capital grants assistance, which include fiscal bonuses and interest rate payment 
grants with no collateral guarantees.  However, taking into consideration that soft loans 
assistance bears a much lower cost in terms of public money devoted to the subsidies than 
capital grants assistance (with much lower gross grant equivalent subsidy levels), the impact 
estimates retrieved from analysis indicates that soft loans possess an higher employment 
effectiveness than capital grants.  This finding is reflected in a higher per-firm employment 
return of soft loans assistance than capital grant assistance, holding constant the GGE value of 
the incentives awarded to each assisted firm.  Thus, there is a lower cost of the soft loan 
assistance compared to the capital grant assistance for each additional new job generated by 
the programs. 
Overall, such empirical evidence produced by the analysis points into the direction of 
considering emphasizing soft loans assistance rather than capital grants to support small and 
medium enterprises. This is possibly due to the fact that credit market imperfection might 
temper the efforts of obtaining full funding for many viable investments projects of small and 
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medium enterprises. This is also in spite of the fact that loan assistance leaves the firms more 
highly leveraged.   
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Table 1: National Programs  
Law reference 
 
Program activity  
Eligible sectors 
 
Eligible beneficiaries 
Type of incentives 
(2001-03 period) 
228/97 art. 4 
Aid for firms located in 
areas at risk of 
flooding   
Multi-sectors (*) SMEs Interest rate grants(**) 
226/99 art. 3 
 
Loans Renegotiations 
(original assistance 
provided by Law 35/95 
for firms affected by 
floods) 
 
Multi-sectors(*) 
SMEs & large firms & 
professionals  
 
Interest rate grants(**) 
662/96 art. 2, c. 3 
 
Incentives for 
investments in 
“Territorial Pacts” 
(Patti Territoriali) areas 
Multi-sectors(*) SMEs & large firms Capital Grants 
 
95/95 (formerly 
44/86) 
 
 
Aids for promoting 
young 
entrepreneurship 
Multi-sectors(*)  
 
SMEs  
 
 
Capital Grants, Grants for  
current expenditures, 
Soft Loans 
 
236/93 
 
Aids for offering job 
training courses to 
employees 
Manufacturing  
SMEs & large firms & 
consortiums of firms  
Capital Grants 
 
488/92 industry 
art. 1, c. 2 
 
 
Incentives for 
investments in 
economically 
distressed regions  
 
Industrial & Services 
Sectors 
SMEs & large firms Capital Grants 
 
 
215/92 
 
 
Aids to promote 
female 
entrepreneurship  
Multi-sectors(*)  
 
Small firms; 
Public & private entities 
devoted to promoting job 
trainings and technical 
assistance  
Capital Grants  
 
 
D.M. 593/00 
 
 
Incentives to support 
R&D activities 
sponsored by the 
“Fund for Aids to 
Research Activities” 
Multi-sectors(*)  
 
SMEs & large firms Capital Grants  
 
(*) No specific sector limitations. 
 (**) With no direct collateral guarantees. 
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Table 2: Former National Programs Devolved to the Regional Government 
Law 
Reference 
 
Program Activity  
Eligible Sectors 
 
Eligible 
Beneficiaries 
Type of Incentives 
(2001-03 period) 
598/94 art.11  
 
Incentives for 
innovation and 
environmental 
investments  
Manufacturing, 
constructions & 
mining sectors 
SMEs Interest rate grants (**)  
1329/65 
Incentives for 
investments in 
machineries 
Multi-sectors (*) SMEs Interest rate grants (**) 
341/95 art. 1  
Automatic incentives 
for investment in 
distressed areas  
Industrial& service 
sectors 
SMEs & large 
firms 
Tax credit/fiscal bonus 
140/97  
Automatic incentives 
for innovation and R&D 
expenditures 
Industrial sectors 
SMEs large 
firms 
Tax credit/fiscal bonus 
266/97 art. 14  
Aids to firms in 
distressed urban areas 
Multi-sectors (*) Small firms Capital Grants 
266/97 art. 8  
Automatic incentives 
for investments  
Industrial& service 
sectors 
SMEs Tax credit/fiscal bonus 
 
(*) No specific sector limitations. 
 (**) With no direct collateral guarantees. 
.  
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Table 3: Regional Programs 
 
Law 
reference  
Program activity 
Eligible sectors 
 
Eligible beneficiaries 
Type of incentives 
(2001-03 period) 
Reg. Law 
67/94 
Incentives for 
investments aimed at 
boosting employment in 
cooperative firms  
All sectors except 
construction and 
consumption 
cooperative firms  
New Cooperative firms or 
existing cooperative firms with 
investments projects requiring  
increases in the  workforce 
Soft Loans 
& Capital Grants 
Reg. Law 
24/97 art. 6 
Aids for developing 
clusters of firms in 
industrial districts  
Multi-sectors (*) 
Cooperative firms, consortiums 
and associations  among 
SMEs, 
Capital Grants 
Reg. Law 
28/93 
(modified by 
Reg. Law. 
22/97, Title II) 
Aids for promoting start-
up firms 
Multi-sectors (*) 
 
Solo-entrepreneur firms, 
corporation or partnership 
firms with a prevailing share of 
young partners, dislocated  or 
female workers 
 
Soft Loans and 
Capital Grants for start-
up expenditures and 
technical and operating 
assistance  
Reg. Law 
56/86 
Incentives for innovations 
& technological 
advancement in SMEs 
and for the adoption of 
quality systems in small 
firms  
 
Multi-sectors (*) 
SMEs or partnerships of 
SMEs. 
Soft Loans 
 
 
(*) No specific sector limitations. 
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Table 4: Obj.2 Area Programs Co-Funded by the ERDF 
Law reference  Program activity 
 
Eligible sectors 
 
Eligible 
beneficiaries 
Type of incentives 
(2001-03 period) 
Measure 1.2a 
Aids to support 
international market 
exposure 
Multi-sectors (*) SMEs Capital Grants 
Measure 2.1b 
Soft Loans to support 
investment projects 
Multi-sectors (*) SMEs Soft Loans 
Measure 2.1d 
Investments assistance 
in conjunction with EIB 
financing 
Multi-sectors (*) SMEs Capital Grants 
Measure 2.2b 
Aids for financing 
corporate participations 
& acquisitions 
Multi-sectors (*) SMEs 
Soft Loans for financing 
corporate participations 
&acquisitions 
Measure 2.2c 
Aids for consulting 
services 
Multi-sectors (*) SMEs Capital Grants 
Measure 2.4c 
Support to develop e-
commerce platforms 
Multi-sectors (*) SMEs Capital Grants 
Measure 4.1b 
Soft loans to support 
investment projects 
Multi-sectors (*) SMEs Soft Loans 
 
(*) No specific sector limitations. 
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Table 5:  Summary of Programs Incentives* 
 
 (*) Summary statistics are for incentives approved between 01.01.2001-31.12.2003 and awarded to firms with establishments  
in the Piemonte region and with a firm identifier (VAT code) traceable in the ISTAT-ASIA  database. All figures are in terms of 
Gross grant Equivalent (GGE) values. 
(**) As a number of assisted firms are subsidized by more than one program in the 2001-2003 period , the actual total  
 
Note: (#.###) Dots are used as 1.000 separators. 
  
Law reference Program activity N. Assisted 
projects
Total GGE value 
of the 
incentives 
(1=1€)
Average GGE 
value of the 
incentives per 
assisted project 
(1=1€)
l. 488/92  Incentives for investments in economically
distressed regions
232 65.392.306 281.863   
l. 266/97 art.  14  Aids to firms in distressed urban areas 1.619 49.138.938 30.351   
l. 140/97  Automatic incentives for innovation and R&D
expenditures 
1.475 48.807.976 33.090   
l. 341/95  Automatic incentives for investments in
distressed areas
1.414 46.358.249 32.785   
l. 598/94 (cap. grants + soft loans)  Incentives for innovation and environmental
investments
740 40.267.195 54.415   
l. 662/96 art. 2, c. 3  Incentives for investments in “Territorial Pacts”
(Patti Territoriali) areas
132 31.612.298 239.487   
l. 1329/65  Incentives for investments in machineries 914 27.548.395 30.140   
l. 226/99  Loans Renegotiations (Law 35/95 for firms
affected by floods)
90 18.984.789 210.942   
Docup 1.2a Ob2 (+ 1.2a PhO)  Aids for International market exposure 634 18.745.511 29.567   
l. 228/97 Aids for firms located in areas at risk of flooding 39 15.084.231 386.775   
Docup 2.1d Ob2 (+ 2.1d PhO)  Investments assistance in conjunction with EIB
financing 
51 11.049.801 216.663   
l.r. 24/97  Aids for developing clusters of firms in
industrial districts
174 6.868.848 39.476   
Docup 2.2c Ob2 (+ 2.2c PhO)  Aids for consulting services 490 5.355.000 10.929   
D.M. 593/00  Incentives to support R&D activities 47 2.971.905 63.232   
Docup 2.4c (+Ob 2.4c PhO)  Assistance to support  e-commerce selling 
services 
148 2.608.449 17.625   
l. 215/92  Aids to promote female entrepreneurship 37 2.233.670 60.369   
l.r. 22/97 (cap. grants + soft loans)  Aids for promoting start-up firms 76 975.965 12.842   
Docup 2.1b Ob2 (+2.1b PhO)  Soft Loans to support investment projects 231 685.502 2.968   
l.r. 56/86  Incentives for innovations & technological 
advancement in SMEs and for the adoption of
215 496.314 2.308   
l. 95/95 (cap. grants + soft loans)  Aids for promoting young entrepreneurship 1 344.865 344.865   
Docup 2.2b Ob2 (+ 2.2b PhO)  Aids for financing corporate participations
&acquisitions
32 158.998 4.969   
l. 236/93  Aids for offering job training courses to
employees 
8 120.514 15.064   
l.r. 67/94 (cap. grants + soft loans)  Incentives for investments aimed at boosting
employment in cooperative firms
3 27.120 9.040   
Docup 4.1b Ob2 (+ 4.1b PhO)  Soft loans to support investment projects 6 23.103 3.851   
Total(**) 8.808 395.859.942 44.943
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Table 6: Distribution of Subsidized Firms by Number of Programs from Which They 
Received Assistance 
 
  N. of programs from which assistance was received*   
  
1 2-3 4 or more Total 
Size of assisted firms  
1 -9 employees 79,1% 19,2% 1,7% 100% 
10 -49 employees 56,5% 36,9% 6,6% 100% 
50-249 employees 39,9% 41,2% 18,9% 100% 
250+ employees 75,0% 23,7% 1,3% 100% 
          
* Multiple investment projects made by a same assisted firm under the provision of a same program are 
counted one time. Incentives are those approved between 01.01.2001-31.12.2003 and awarded to firms 
with establishments in the Piemonte Region and with a firm identifier (VAT code) traceable in the ISTAT-
ASIA  database. 
 
Note: (##,#) Commas are used as decimal dividers. 
 
 Source: Istat-Asia data, Italian Ministry of Production Activities, Mediocredito central, Regione Piemonte, Finpiemonte, 
Sviluppo Italia Piemonte.  
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Table 7: Share of Active Firms that Received Public Assistance 
 
   
  
 Non-Assisted 
firms 
Assisted
 firms 
 Total  
    
TOTAL 88,9% 11,1% 100% 
    
    
Size of Assisted firms    
1 - 9 employees 95,7% 4,3% 100% 
10 - 49 employees 62,5% 37,5% 100% 
50 - 249 employees 36,5% 63,5% 100% 
250 +  employees 57,3% 42,7% 100% 
    
        
 
Source: Istat-Asia data, Italian Ministry of Production Activities, Mediocredito central, Regione Piemonte, Finpiemonte, 
Sviluppo Italia Piemonte. 
 
Note: (##,#) Commas are used as decimal dividers. 
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Table 8:   Employment Change in Assisted- & Non-Assisted-Firms  
(Descriptive Statistics) 
  N. of firms* 
2000-2003 Avrg. 
per-firm empl. 
change** Stand. Dev. 
 
   
Non-assisted  42.310 -0,76 7,91 
Assisted 5.284 0,48 16,03 
        
    
* Sample of firms without 0.5 ‰ outliers (0.5 ‰ outliers =firms with a 2000-2003 
employment change with an absolute value within the 0.5 ‰ percentile of the two tails 
of the distribution). 
** Absolute per-firm changes (1=1 job). 
 
Note: (#.###) Dots are used as 1.000 separators. 
Note: (##,#) Commas are used as decimal dividers. 
 
Source: Istat-Asia data, Italian Ministry of Production Activities, Mediocredito central, Regione Piemonte, Finpiemonte, 
Sviluppo Italia Piemonte. 
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Table 9: Employment Change in Assisted Firms Sorted by EGG Values of the Incentives 
     (Descriptive statistics) 
    N. of firms* 
2000-2003 Average 
per-firm empl. 
change** Stand. Dev. 
     
Quartiles GGE  val. of the incentives in €       
1°  1  -  9.661 1.321 0,51 8,09 
2° 9.662  -  25.685 1.321 -0,78 14,69 
3°  25.686   -  69.857 1.321 -0,28 15,70 
4°  > 69.857 (max: 8.227.439) 1.321 2,48 22,24 
   5.284   
Deciles GGE val. of the incentives in €    
1° 1  -  4.085 529 0,60 7,47 
2° 4.086  - 7.586 528 0,62 9,71 
3° 7.587  -  11.860 529 -0,45 10,66 
4° 11.861  -  17.532 528 -0,89 15,35 
5° 17.533  -  25.685 528 -0,57 14,31 
6° 25.686  -  37.187  529 -0,76 15,11 
7° 37.188  -  56.108 528 0,22 16,21 
8° 56.109  -  89.350 529 -0,24 16,77 
9° 89.351  -  168.795 528 2,55 19,39 
10°  > 168.795  (max: 8.227.439) 528 3,76 26,49 
   5.284   
Highest 
percentiles GGE val. of the incentives in €    
90°-95° 168.795 - 269.302 264 1,69 20,69 
95° - 99,5° 269.303 - 909.742 238 4,73 31,30 
>99.5°  >909.742 26 15,87 28,14 
          
 
* Sample of firms without 0,5 ‰ outliers (0,5 ‰ outliers =firms with a 2000-2003 employment change with an absolute 
value within the 0,5 ‰ percentile of the two tails of the distribution). 
** Absolute per-firm changes (1=1 job). 
 
Note: (#.###) Dots are used as 1.000 separators. 
Note: (##,#) Commas are used as decimal dividers. 
 
 
 Source: Istat-Asia data, Italian Ministry of Production Activities, Mediocredito central, Regione Piemonte, Finpiemonte, Sviluppo Italia 
Piemonte. 
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Table 10: Employment Changes in Assisted Firms Sorted by Type of Subsidy & EGG 
Values of the Incentives. (Descriptive statistics) 
* Sample of firms without 0,5 ‰ outliers (0,5 ‰:outliers =firms with a 2000-2003 employment change with an absolute 
value within the 0,5 ‰ percentile of the two tails of the distribution). 
** Absolute per-firm changes (1=1 job). 
 
Note: (#.###) Dots are used as 1.000 separators. 
Note: (##,#) Commas are used as decimal dividers. 
 
 Source: Istat-Asia data, Italian Ministry of Production Activities, Mediocredito central, Regione Piemonte, Finpiemonte, Sviluppo Italia 
Piemonte. 
 
 
  
 
N. of firms*
 . 
 Stand. Dev.
Assisted firms
Firms  assisted with capital grants 3.999 0,13 16,63
Firms assisted with soft-loans 236  1,61 8,78
Firms assisted with both capital grants and soft-loans 1.049 1,57 14,85
Firms  assisted with capital grants GGE value of the incentives
1° Quartile (up to 9.661 €) 969  0,05 6,002° Quartile (9.662€ - 25.685€) 1.096 -0,83 15,453° Quartile (25.686€ - 69.857€) 1.031 -0,40 16,834° Quartile 69.858€ or more . (Max 8.227.439€) 903  1,98 23,86
Firms assisted with soft-loans GGE value of the incentives
 1° Quartile (up to 9.661 €) 233  1,62 8,832° Quartile (9.662€ - 25.685€) 3  0,61 0,603° Quartile ( 25.686€ - 69.857€) 0 - -
4° Quartile 69.858€ or more . (Max 8.227.439€) 0 - -
Firms assisted with both capital grants and soft-loans GGE value of the incentives
1° Quartile (up to 9.661 €) 119  2,03 16,602° Quartile ( 9.662€ - 25.685€) 222  -0,58 10,263° Quartile ( 25.686€ - 69.857€) 290  0,16 10,744° Quartile 69.858€ or more . (Max 8.227.439€)
 
418  3,56 18,24
2000-2003 
Average per-
firm empl. 
change** 
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Table 11: Employment Changes by Firm Size & GGE Values of the Incentives 
 
* Sample of firms without 0,5 ‰ outliers (0,5 ‰ outliers =firms with a 2000-2003 employment change with an absolute 
value within the 0,5 ‰ percentile of the two tails of the distribution). 
** Absolute per-firm changes (1=1 job). 
 
Note: (#.###) Dots are used as 1.000 separators. 
Note: (##,#) Commas are used as decimal dividers. 
 
 Source: Istat-Asia data, Italian Ministry of Production Activities, Mediocredito central, Regione Piemonte, Finpiemonte, Sviluppo Italia 
Piemonte. 
 
  
N. of  firms* Dev. stand.
1-9 workers
Non -assisted 37126 -0,12 2,71 
Assisted: 1684 2,79 9,51 
I quartile: (up to  9.661 €) 679 1,65 7,53 
II quartile: (9.662€ - 25.685€) 496 1,94 5,91 
III quartile: ( 25.686€ - 69.857€) 313 3,00 10,37 
IV quartile: (69.858 or more €) 196 7,49 17,13 
10 – 49  workers 
Non -assisted 4694 -3,51 9,04 
Assisted: 2811 0,32 8,60 
I quartile: (up to 9.661 €) 600 -0,68 6,19 
II quartile: ( 9.662€ a 25.685€) 699 -0,56 9,02 
III quartile: (25.686€ a 69.857€) 815 0,17 7,88 
IV quartile: ( 69.858or more €) 697 2,27 10,26 
50 - 249 workers
Non - assisted 409 -23,36 49,61 
Assisted: 724 -2,22 27,49 
I quartile: (up to 9.661 €) 42 -0,88 23,70 
II quartile: (9.662€ - 25.685€) 118 -12,01 30,94 
III quartile: (25.686€ - 69.857€) 177 -5,38 23,86 
IV quartile: (69.858€ or more) 387 2,05 27,44 
250+ workers 
Non - assisted 79 -19,19 94,57 
Assisted 65 -22,51 79,28 
I quartile: (up to 9.661 €) 0 - - 
II quartile: (9.662€ - 25.685€) 8 -23,87 103,93 
III quartile: (25.686€ - 69.857€) 16 -44,05 81,85 
IV quartile: (69.858€ or more) 41 -13,83 73,42 
2000-2003 
Avg. per-firm 
empl. 
change** 
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Dep. var.: 2000-2003 per-firm absolute empl. change (1=1 job)
T_qrt_1 (=1 if incentives have GGE val. up to 9.661 €) 1,87 0,254 0,000
T_qrt_2 (=1 if incentives have GGE val.  9.662 € - 25.685€) 1,69 0,259 0,000
T_qrt_3  (=1 if incentives have GGE val. 25.686€- 69.857€) 3,20 0,265 0,000
T_qrt_4 (=1 if incentives have GGE val  69.858€  or more  -Max 8.227.439€) 6,86 0,286 0,000
10-49 workers -3,52 0,130 0,000
50-249 workers -15,75 0,322 0,000
250+ workers -24,93 0,761 0,000
Vercelli 0,35 0,223 0,120
Novara 0,29 0,156 0,059
Cuneo 0,44 0,132 0,001
Asti 0,37 0,208 0,073
Alessandria 0,40 0,148 0,007
Biella -0,20 0,197 0,301
Verbania 0,23 0,219 0,284
CB Non energetic mineral extraction 0,30 0,762 0,695
DA- Food industries, drinks, tobacco 0,42 0,589 0,479
DB- Textile industries -0,01 0,594 0,991
DC- Hide and leather industries 0,28 0,793 0,726
DD- wood industries 0,17 0,597 0,771
DE- Paper , printing and publishing 0,14 0,601 0,814
DF-Coke manufacturing and refineries -0,54 2,210 0,805
DG-Chemical product manufacturing  0,72 0,710 0,309
DH-Rubber and plastic 0,91 0,630 0,149
DI- Processing of non-metallic minerals 0,64 0,621 0,303
DJ-Metal and metallic products 0,33 0,583 0,576
DK- Manufacturing and repair of machineries. 0,51 0,589 0,384
DL- Manufacturing of electrical machinery 0,13 0,589 0,831
DM- Vehicle manufacturing -0,08 0,666 0,899
DN- Other manufacturing industries 0,17 0,595 0,777
Craft  enterprise -1,39 0,115 0,000
Single unit -0,48 0,161 0,003
New firm (=1 if started after 31.12.2000) 0,41 0,123 0,001
Dead firm (=1 if ceased before 31.12.2003) -11,42 0,215 0,000
constant 1,67 0,588 0,005
Number of observations 42038
Adjusted  R2 0,146
F 217,820 
Prob>F 0,000
Table 12: Programs Impacts by Quartiles of the EGG Values of the Incentives 
Independent variables
Estimated
coefficient
Standard 
Deviation 
 
P-Value 
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Dip. var.: 2000-2003 per-firm absolute empl. change (1=1 job)
T_cap_grants 2,83 0,165 0,000
T_soft_loans 2,44 0,579 0,000
T_mix- (capital grants  &  soft loans) 4,16 0,297 0,000
-3,41 0,129 0,000
-15,29 0,325 0,000
-26,64 0,783 0,000
0,27 0,222 0,230
0,21 0,155 0,180
0,39 0,131 0,003
0,29 0,206 0,157
0,41 0,147 0,005
-0,33 0,197 0,094
0,10 0,218 0,645
0,33 0,762 0,665
0,37 0,586 0,523
-0,12 0,591 0,841
0,22 0,788 0,780
0,15 0,594 0,804
0,19 0,598 0,745
-0,02 2,198 0,992
0,88 0,706 0,215
0,95 0,625 0,129
0,44 0,617 0,477
0,23 0,580 0,691
0,52 0,586 0,376
0,11 0,586 0,845
0,40 0,660 0,544
0,13 0,592 0,828
-1,44 0,114 0,000
-0,48 0,161 0,003
0,37 0,122 0,003
-11,54 0,214 0,000
1,79 0,585 0,002
N. of Observations 42050
Adjusted  R2 0,144
F 221,630
Prob>F 0,000
Table 13 – Programs Impacts by Types of Subsidies
Independent variables
Estimated
coefficient
Standard 
Deviation 
 
P-value 
10-49 workers 
50-249 workers 
250+ workers 
Vercelli
Novara
Cuneo
Asti 
Alessandria
Biella 
Verbania
CB Non energetic mineral extraction 
DA- Food industries, drinks, tobacco 
DB- Textile industries 
DC- Hide and leather industries
DD- wood industries
DE- Paper , printing and publishing
DF-Coke manufacturing and refineries 
DG-Chemical product manufacturing  
DH-Rubber and plastic 
DI- Processing of non-metallic minerals 
DJ-Metal and metallic products
DK- Manufacturing and repair of machineries. 
DL- Manufacturing of electrical machinery
DM- Vehicle manufacturing
DN- Other manufacturing industries 
Craft  enterprise
Single unit
New firm (=1 if started after 31.12.2000) 
Dead firm (=1 if ceased before 31.12.2003)
constant
